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Sterk and Pollack: A Knock on Knick's Revival of Federal Takings Litigation

A KNOCK ON KNICK’S REVIVAL OF FEDERAL TAKINGS
LITIGATION
Stewart E. Sterk* & Michael C. Pollack**
Abstract
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the United States Supreme Court held
that a landowner who claimed to have suffered a taking at the hands of
state or local officials could seek redress in federal court without the need
to first seek compensation through state proceedings. This holding raises
serious theoretical and practical concerns. On the theoretical side, Knick
rests on the implicit assumption that states separate powers among
branches of government in the same way the federal government does. It
also relies on a second assumption: that relegating taking claims to state
court makes them unique. Neither is true.
Beyond the opinion’s shaky theoretical foundation, Knick will require
federal courts to determine precisely when an alleged “taking” is in fact
complete and final—an issue they have heretofore been spared.
Moreover, nothing in the Court’s opinion limits its scope to regulatory
takings. The opinion simply does not deal with the host of ways in which
state and local government can interfere with private property rights.
These include taking actions on adjacent property that have adverse
impacts on a landowner’s parcel (like sewage backups or flooding) and
explicitly exercising the eminent domain power. Unless the Court
narrows its opinion, the Court’s conceptual separation of takings from
just compensation threatens to open the doors of federal courts to a
variety of claims that the Court does not appear to have anticipated and
that federal courts are ill-equipped to address—including but not limited
to claims for valuation of property taken through exercise of the eminent
domain power.
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INTRODUCTION
When a landowner contends that government action has effected a
taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,1 where can she sue? Until the
United States Supreme Court decided Knick v. Township of Scott2 in June
2019,3 the answer was clear: State court and only state court. This was so
because the Court held over thirty years ago in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank4 that a takings claim
brought in federal court was unripe until after the aggrieved landowner
had used state procedures to seek compensation.5 More recently, in San
Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco,6 the Court applied preclusion
principles to deny a federal forum to a plaintiff who came to federal court
after having unsuccessfully pursued a takings claim in state court.7 The
result: federal redress was available to a landowner only if the United
States Supreme Court was to entertain review of a final state court
determination.8
No longer. Concerned that its case law had transformed the
Constitution’s takings protection into a uniquely second-class
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
2. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
3. Id. at 2167.
4. 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162.
5. Id. at 195.
6. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
7. Id. at 347.
8. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 251, 283, 300–01 (2006).
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constitutional right,9 the Court in Knick overruled Williamson County and
held that a landowner who claimed to have suffered a taking at the hands
of state or local officials could seek redress in federal court without the
need to first seek compensation through state proceedings. 10 The Court
accomplished this result by separating the state’s alleged “taking” of
property from its denial of “just compensation.”11 The Court held that the
federal claim ripened when the alleged taking was complete, without
regard to whether the state had in place a procedure for providing just
compensation.12
While many have cheered this result,13 the Court’s reasoning and its
conclusion both raise serious problems—and those problems go beyond
those identified by the dissenting justices. First, Knick rests on a
questionable theoretical foundation, for it effectively assumes that states
separate powers among branches of government in the same way the
federal government does. But there is no federal constitutional
requirement that they do so, and the states generally do not. The Court’s
concern that relegating taking claims to state court makes them unique is
also questionable, to say the least. Quite the contrary, the Court’s
preclusion doctrine limits access to federal courts for plaintiffs who
contend that state or local officials have violated numerous other
constitutional rights, including the Fourth Amendment.
Second, beyond the opinion’s shaky theoretical foundation, Knick
raises a whole host of unaddressed and apparently unnoticed practical
questions. The Court’s opinion will require federal courts to determine
precisely when an alleged “taking” is in fact complete and final—an issue
they have heretofore been spared given Williamson County’s
compensation-seeking requirement. Moreover, the Court’s opinions do
not account for the many ways in which taking claims can arise—a
product of the host of ways in which state and local government can
interfere with private property rights. These include regulating property
through the zoning process, making pronouncements that reduce the

9. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169 (“The state-litigation requirement relegates the Takings Clause
‘to the status of a poor relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.” (quoting Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994))).
10. Id. at 2168.
11. Id. at 2170.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Michael Ramsey, A Small Step Forward in Knick, ORIGINALISM BLOG
(June 22, 2019), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2019/06/a-small-stepforward-in-knickmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/9M8P-QSZJ]; Ilya Somin, Supreme
Court Overrules Precedent that Created “Catch-22” for Property Owners Attempting to Bring
Takings Cases in Federal Court, REASON (June 21, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://reason.com/2019/
06/21/supreme-court-overrules-precedent-that-created-catch-22-for-property-owners-attempting
-to-bring-takings-cases-in-federal-court/ [https://perma.cc/WC78-K9HN].
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value of property like announcing a future condemnation,14 taking actions
on adjacent property that have adverse impacts on a landowner’s parcel
like sewage backups or flooding,15 explicitly exercising the eminent
domain power,16 and more. Knick dealt with regulation, but the Court’s
conceptual separation of takings from just compensation might open the
doors of federal courts to a variety of other sorts of taking claims that the
Court does not appear to have anticipated. In particular, federal courts
might even have jurisdiction over claims by condemnees seeking to avoid
state substantive rules and procedures for valuing property taken for
public use.
This Article critiques Knick along both these theoretical and practical
lines. This Article does not predict how courts will ultimately resolve the
practical issues. It will not be long, however, before the Court will be
faced with the need to clean up the mess it made.
I. KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT AND ITS PREDECESSORS
An understanding of Knick and its flaws requires an examination of
two earlier cases that channeled takings litigation into the state courts.
This Part examines those two cases before turning to the Knick opinions.
A. Williamson County and San Remo
In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee
developer’s taking claim in federal district court was unripe for two
reasons: First, the developer had not obtained a final decision on its
application for a new residential subdivision.17 Second, the developer had
not used the relevant state procedures for obtaining just compensation.18
In defending the second ripeness requirement, the Court emphasized that
“[t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it
proscribes taking without just compensation.”19 As a result, the Court
concluded that so long as the state provides a procedure for a landowner
to obtain just compensation, the landowner cannot proceed to federal
court until she has used that procedure and been denied compensation.20
This resolution was somewhat unexpected. When the Supreme Court
first granted certiorari in Williamson County, the assumption was that it
would resolve a then-unresolved question: Are damages available as a
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Minn. 2003).
15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 928 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ohio 2010).
16. See. e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 520 (2005).
17. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186–94
(1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162.
18. Id. at 194–97.
19. Id. at 194.
20. Id. at 194–95.
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remedy for unconstitutional land use regulation, or is the affected
landowner limited to injunctive relief?21 The plaintiff developer in that
case had obtained preliminary subdivision approval and spent $3.5
million on a golf course and sewer facilities, only to see the county amend
its zoning ordinance to reduce permissible density in that area. 22 County
agencies disagreed about what to do next: The Planning Commission
concluded that the new ordinance should apply to the developer’s
subdivision, and though the Board of Zoning Appeals disagreed, the
Planning Commission concluded that the Board of Zoning Appeals could
not overrule it.23 Hamilton Bank, which had obtained title to the parcel
through foreclosure, then sued in federal court, alleging a taking.24 A jury
agreed and awarded $350,000 in damages.25 But the trial court, while
issuing an injunction, entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
the damages claim, concluding that temporary deprivations could not
constitute a taking as a matter of law.26 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed and held that damages were available.27
The Court punted the damages question by concluding that the claim
was unripe, but the Court’s ripeness holding was more than a convenient
ruse for avoiding a controversial issue. The Court could have
accomplished that objective by focusing on finality alone—without
articulating the requirement that a taking plaintiff use state procedures—
because of the disagreement between county agencies, and because the
developer still had administrative options available like seeking a
variance from either the Board of Zoning Appeals (which had the power
to vary the density limits in the zoning ordinance) or from the Planning
Commission (which had power to depart from several subdivision
regulations). But the Court went further and held that the landowner had
not used available state procedures to seek compensation, emphasizing
that Tennessee state courts allow recovery through “inverse
condemnation” suits when restrictive development regulations effect a
taking.28
The Williamson County opinion appeared to contemplate that a
landowner could ripen a federal court takings claim by seeking all relief
available under state law. But the Court’s subsequent opinion in San
Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco made it clear that a landowner
21. That was the question on which the court granted certiorari. See id. at 185.
22. Id. at 178.
23. Id. at 179–82.
24. Id. at 182.
25. Id. at 183.
26. Id.
27. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 729 F.2d 402, 409 (6th
Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019).
28. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 196.
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who raised the takings claim in state court would instead be precluded
from subsequently raising the same claim in federal court by operation of
the federal Full Faith and Credit Statute.29 The Court held that a
landowner who had raised a state constitutional takings claim in state
court could not subsequently raise a federal takings claim in federal court
because the issues underlying the two claims were identical.30 Its
reasoning appeared to rely on issue preclusion doctrine,31 but because the
takings plaintiff could have also raised its federal takings claim in that
state court proceeding, claim preclusion doctrine would have precluded
it from subsequently raising that federal claim in federal court too, even
if the plaintiff chose not to raise it in the state proceeding. 32 In effect,
then, Williamson County and San Remo together operated to channel all
takings claims (other than those against the federal government) into state
court.
B. The Knick Opinions
Williamson County and San Remo generated concern from those who
contended that, by limiting takings plaintiffs’ access to federal courts, the
Court had relegated takings protection into the status of a second-class
constitutional right.33 In Knick, the landowner, represented by the Pacific

29. San Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347–48 (2005); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (explaining how full faith and credit applies).
30. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347.
31. The Court observed that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had relied on issue preclusion principles to
hold landowner’s claim barred. Id. at 334–35. In affirming, the Court emphasized that the
landowner had advanced in state court the same constitutional issues it later asked the federal
courts to resolve. Id. at 341. The Court’s opinion states that “we are presently concerned only with
issues actually decided by the state court that are dispositive of federal claims raised under
§ 1983.” Id. at 343. The focus on issues actually decided suggests that the Court, like the courts
below, had issue preclusion doctrine in mind. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27
(AM. LAW INST. 1982) (noting that issue preclusion applies to issues “actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment”).
32. See Sterk, supra note 8, at 281–82.
33. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson County’s
Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41 URB.
LAW. 615, 650 (2009) (lamenting exclusion of individual rights in property from the class of civil
rights protected by § 1983); J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out but You Can Never Leave:
The Story of San Remo Hotel––The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State
Courts Under a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 247, 281 (2006) (arguing that San Remo “has singled out property owners as second-class
constitutional claimants”); Gideon Kanner, “[Un]Equal Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously
Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065,
1073 (2007) (characterizing property owners complaining of takings as “legal pariahs who, unlike
other constitutionally aggrieved plaintiffs, are barred from seeking their federal constitutional
remedy from the federal courts”).
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Legal Foundation, urged the Court to overrule Williamson County. By a
vote of 5–4, the Court did just that.34
1. The Facts
Rose Knick’s ninety-acre Pennsylvania parcel included a small family
cemetery.35 In 2012, the Township of Scott enacted an ordinance
requiring that cemeteries be open to the public during the day. 36 When
town officials discovered the cemetery on Ms. Knick’s parcel the
following year, they informed her that she was violating the ordinance.37
Ms. Knick then proceeded to state court, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on the ground that the ordinance worked a taking of her
property.38 She did not seek compensation. The town responded by
withdrawing the violation notice and agreeing to stay enforcement
pending resolution of the state court proceeding.39 The state court,
however, declined to rule on Ms. Knick’s request for declaratory and
injunctive relief because, in the absence of enforcement by the town, she
could not show the irreparable harm necessary for obtaining injunctive
relief.40
Ms. Knick then sued in federal district court, alleging that the
ordinance constituted a taking.41 The district court dismissed her claim as
unripe,42 citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,43 and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.44

34. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019).
35. Id. at 2168.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2169.
43. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200 (1985),
overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162.
44. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019).
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2. The Majority Opinion
Writing for five Justices, Chief Justice John Roberts started by
opining that “[t]he San Remo preclusion trap should tip us off that the
state-litigation requirement [in Williamson County] rests on a mistaken
view of the Fifth Amendment.”45 In the Court’s view, the requirement
was inconsistent with the supposed “guarantee” provided by the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 (commonly referred to as “Section 1983”) of a federal
forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state
officials.46
While noting that Williamson County’s finality requirement “is not at
issue here,”47 the majority concluded that “[t]he state-litigation
requirement relegates the Takings Clause ‘to the status of a poor relation’
among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”48 By overruling that
requirement, the Court claimed to be “restoring takings claims to the fullfledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned.”49
Analytically, the Court rejected the contention underlying the
Williamson County state-litigation requirement that no constitutional
violation occurs until the state actually denies compensation.50 Instead,
the Court held, “If a local government takes private property without
paying for it, that government has violated the Fifth Amendment—just as
the Takings Clause says—without regard to subsequent state court
proceedings.”51 As a result, an aggrieved landowner can bring the takings
claim in federal court at the moment of the alleged taking, regardless of
any post-taking remedies the state might make available.52
The Chief Justice then turned to whether stare decisis counseled in
favor of retaining Williamson County, however incorrect its reasoning.53
Because the Williamson County analysis was “exceptionally ill founded”
and because the state-litigation requirement had generated no reliance
interests, the Court concluded, the reasons for retaining the requirement
were weak.54

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169.
Id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)).
Id. at 2170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2177–79.
Id.
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3. The Dissent
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for four dissenting Justices, rejected the
majority’s effort to analogize the Takings Clause to other constitutional
protections. She argued that “[t]he distinctive aspects of litigating a
takings claim merely reflect the distinctive aspects of the constitutional
right.”55 As an example, she noted that a Fourth Amendment claim arises
when “a police officer uses excessive force, because the Constitution
prohibits that thing and that thing only,” while a takings claim arises
“only [when] two things occur: (1) the government takes property, and
(2) it fails to pay just compensation.”56
The dissent also contended that overruling Williamson County would
have two damaging consequences: it will “turn . . . well-meaning
government officials into lawbreakers[, a]nd it will subvert important
principles of judicial federalism.”57 In support of the federalism point,
Justice Kagan emphasized that—unlike other constitutional claims—
takings claims require a court to decide “whether, under state law, the
plaintiff has a property interest in the thing regulated.”58 The state law
questions that underlie taking claims, she noted, are not familiar to federal
courts,59 and she lamented that the Court’s decision will “send[] a flood
of complex state-law issues to federal courts”60 and “make[] federal
courts a principal player in local and state land-use disputes.”61
Justice Kagan offered several examples of state law issues that federal
courts will now have to resolve—starting with the background cemetery
law in Pennsylvania necessary to resolve the question in Knick itself.62
She also noted differences in the scope of state public trust doctrine,
differences which might affect the validity of state regulation of
beachfront land.63
Finally, Justice Kagan lamented the short shrift the Court’s opinion
gave to stare decisis, especially because Congress had the power to
eliminate the so-called “preclusion trap” by amending the federal law that
requires federal courts to afford preclusive effect to these sorts of state
court judgments.64
55. Id. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2187.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2188.
60. Id. at 2188–89.
61. Id. at 2189.
62. Id. at 2187–88.
63. Id. at 2188.
64. Id. at 2189. For a defense of the Court’s decision on stare decisis grounds, see Ilya
Somin & Shelley Ross Saxer, Overturning a Catch-22 in the Knick of Time: Knick v. Township
of Scott and the Doctrine of Precedent, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3523194 [https://perma.cc/E296-UWDW].
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II. THEORETICAL ISSUES
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Court’s opinion in
Knick turns on two theoretical premises: first, that whether the
government’s supposed taking is unconstitutional is conceptually
separate from whether the government has provided just compensation,
and second, that a federal forum must be available for constitutional
violations by state or local officials. Both of those premises are at least
contestable, if not just wrong.
A. Separating “Taking” from “Just Compensation”
The Court’s primary argument relies on the idea that the government
taking of property is conceptually complete prior to the ultimate
determination by the state that compensation is not owed (or that
compensation will not be rendered in what the plaintiff owner believes is
a sufficient amount).65 So when the Court said that “a property owner has
a claim for a violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a government
takes his property for public use without paying for it,”66 it meant that a
property owner has a claim so long as the state or municipality does not
provide “immediate[]” compensation.67 The subsequent determination by
a state court that compensation is owed has nothing to do with whether
the Takings Clause was violated, according to the Court; instead, it
speaks to whether the state has remedied a violation that already took
place.68
As Justice Kagan explained in her dissent, this is a novel
characterization of the Takings Clause that departs from over a century
of precedent.69 But the Court’s error is not simply a doctrinal one. This
conceptual severance between the alleged taking of property, on the one
hand, and the determination of whether compensation is owed for that
taking, on the other, assumes a separation of powers and functions at the
state level that is not compelled by the U.S. Constitution—and that, in
fact, does not strictly exist. The Court never explicitly articulates its
notion of state government processes, but from its viewpoint, an alleged
taking is complete and ready to be litigated on the merits as soon as some
entity of state or local government takes an action or imposes a

65. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52.
66. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170.
67. See id. at 2172 (emphasis added) (discussing First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 318 (1987)).
68. Id. (“A later payment of compensation may remedy the constitutional violation that
occurred at the time of the taking, but that does not mean the violation never took place.”).
69. Id. at 2182–83, 2185–87 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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regulation.70 That entity might be a city council or a town board,71 or it
might be a statewide entity like the South Carolina Coastal Council.72
Either way, in the Court’s view, once that entity takes action and fails to
pay compensation immediately, any Takings Clause violation is
complete. All that remains is determining the remedy available to the
property owner. For that, the property owner can turn away from the city
council or statewide agency and proceed directly to federal court.
If state and local governments were required to maintain a strict
separation of powers, or if they did in fact maintain such a strict
separation, the Court would have been on somewhat more stable
theoretical footing, at least as concerns this aspect of its decision. But
neither is true. The U.S. Constitution says next to nothing about how
states are to structure their governments beyond the thin requirement that
states have a “Republican Form of Government.”73 As the Court has
previously observed,
Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a
State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or
whether persons . . . belonging to one department may, in
respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly
speaking, pertain to another department of government, is
for the determination of the State.74
And the states have in turn taken a “varied, pragmatic approach in
establishing government[]” that often scrambles the more rigid separation
of powers that exists at the federal level—and that the Knick Court seems
to have had in mind.75
One result of this blurry separation of powers at the state level that is
particularly relevant here has to do with state courts. As one of us has
explored in depth, state law throughout the country charges the state
courts with handling a wide array of functions beyond resolving disputes
and remedying violations of law alleged to have occurred in the past.76
70. See Robert H. Thomas, Sublimating Home Rule and Separation of Powers in Knick v.
Township of Scott, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 27),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3490905 [https://perma.cc/8W3L-QKD5]
(similarly observing, though without disagreement, that the Court “assumed that when a
municipal government is doing the taking, state law making a state court inverse condemnation
lawsuit available was not ‘the [same] government’ doing the compensating”).
71. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110–11 (1978).
72. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007–08 (1992).
73. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
74. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
75. Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 482–83 (1968) (quoting ROBERT C. WOOD,
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 891–92 (1965)).
76. See Michael C. Pollack, The State Courts Beyond Judging (Feb. 12, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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Indeed, some of the roles state courts routinely play are fairly
characterized as quasi-administrative in that they entail making initial
determinations about a person’s entitlement to legal benefits like a formal
name change, a license to practice law, or an abortion without parental
notification or consent.77 Some state court roles are also fairly
characterized as quasi-legislative in that they entail setting policy outside
the context of dispute resolution. Determining the boundaries of
legislative districts and creating new specialty criminal courts like drug
treatment courts and veterans courts are just two examples.78 And while
there are normative reasons to question or reform some of those
allocations,79 there is no legal limitation preventing a state from choosing
to make its courts an integral component of all sorts of regulatory
schemes. This includes land use regulation—both its more legislative
aspects like zoning and its more administrative aspects like granting or
denying variances or other permits.80
Indeed, some states have done just that. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, for example, has intermittently required judicial approval of all
local zoning ordinances to make sure each municipality provides its “fair
share” of the area’s affordable housing needs.81 If a New Jersey
municipality enacted a zoning ordinance that a property owner believed
effected a taking, would the Knick Court think the taking complete when
the municipality enacted the ordinance? Or when the appropriate New
Jersey state court approved it? Adhering to the Knick Court’s cramped
conception of what state legislatures and state courts respectively do
might lead one to conclude the taking was complete upon municipal
enactment. But that would be incoherent because the ordinance would not
77. See id. at 8–22.
78. See id. at 26–33.
79. See id. at 37–63.
80. It is therefore not necessarily the case, as a matter of any constitutional principle, that
state courts are “not acting as an arm of local government” in the takings setting. Thomas, supra
note 70, at 24. Far from being “outmoded,” id., the idea that local governments and state courts
are all instrumentalities of the same state government remains at the foundation of local
government law. See, e.g., Avery, 390 U.S. at 480 (“The actions of local government are the
actions of the State.”); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (“Municipal corporations
are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.”). Even localities with the power
to act independently of the state legislature only have that power because state law—either
constitutional or statutory—affords them it. See, e.g., LYNN A. BAKER, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE &
DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 247 (5th ed. 2015) (“[T]here is nothing either
inevitable or immutable about the relationship between the states and their political
subdivisions….[E]ven those jurisdictions that nominally grant a significant scope of ‘home rule’
authority to their localities may ultimately define the areas of autonomy so narrowly as to permit
[state] legislative control of local activity in most areas of substantive importance.”).
81. See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 438–41
(N.J. 1983).
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actually be effective until the court approves it. At the same time, if the
action did not ripen until court approval, then a citizen’s right to bring her
claim in federal court under Knick would turn entirely on how the state
happened to structure its regulatory system and distribute its regulatory
power: In states like New Jersey, takings plaintiffs would have to run at
least some of their claim through state court before accessing a federal
forum, while in states without this sort of rule, takings plaintiffs could
access a federal forum as soon as the municipality made its decision.
There is no principled basis under the U.S. Constitution for that
distinction, but by overlooking the multiplicity of state and local
government forms, Knick’s logic demands it. By contrast, under
Williamson County, that sort of distinction made no difference at all, and
takings plaintiffs were treated the same across the states in terms of when
they could access federal court.
The problem comes into bolder relief if we think about a state that
goes further and confers on its courts of general jurisdiction the power to
decide in the first instance and all at once whether particular land use
restrictions should proceed with compensation, without compensation, or
not at all. While these sorts of decisions are more typically reserved to
local legislative or administrative bodies, the foregoing discussion
illustrated that state courts are in fact charged with a number of tasks more
typically assigned to legislative or administrative bodies. Suppose, then,
that a state delegated to its courts precisely this decision-making
authority. No property owner could access a federal forum for his federal
takings claim until the state court had made its decision. This state would
therefore have essentially returned its property owners to the Williamson
County regime simply by structuring its decision-making authority in a
particular way. The Knick Court’s reasoning not only fails to account for
this possibility, but affirmatively enables it by leaving the trigger for
access to federal court up to the happenstance of how any given state
structures its land use decision-making process.
Given the flexibility of state separation of powers, there is little limit
to these hypotheticals (and next to none as a matter of federal law). States
could therefore allocate regulatory authority in ways that give state courts
greater or lesser roles at earlier or later stages of the zoning and land use
process. The result under Knick is that plaintiffs’ abilities to access
federal court in vindication of a federal constitutional right will depend
on how states happen to make this choice. The Court appears to have
assumed that state and local regulatory authority would consistently
belong on the front end to some recognizably “legislative” or
“administrative” body, and that compensation would come on the back
end from some recognizably “judicial” body like a state court. But
because none of that is necessarily true, the Court’s holding treats
plaintiffs differently depending on the structure of their state government.
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Worse, the fact that so much now turns on aspects of state law that have
no relevance to when a plaintiff ought to be able to press her takings claim
in federal court suggests that it is indeed quite difficult to conceptually
and consistently separate the alleged taking from the provision of
compensation.
B. Availability of Federal Relief: The “Preclusion Trap”
The balance of the Court’s opinion rests on the supposed “preclusion
trap.” The so-called “trap” is that Williamson County’s second ripeness
prong—requiring property owners to fully litigate their claims for
compensation in state court before turning to federal court—does not
merely postpone federal review. Rather, it prevents review altogether
when joined with the conclusion in San Remo that takings plaintiffs are
precluded by the federal Full Faith and Credit Statute from relitigating
the issues actually litigated in their state court takings cases in federal
district court.82 The result, according to the Knick Court, is an intolerable
“Catch-22”: A takings plaintiff “cannot go to federal court without going
to state court first [under Williamson County]; but if he goes to state court
and loses, his claim will be barred in federal court” under San Remo.83
Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is said to “provide access to a
federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of
state officials.”84 The Williamson County–San Remo obstacle to that
federal forum certainly existed, certainly sounds unfair, and certainly
makes for powerful rhetoric.85 Perhaps that is why the Knick opinion
features the “preclusion trap” phrase three times.86
But the rhetoric belies a few deeper problems with the argument. The
first is one that Justice Kagan gestured to in her dissent in Knick.87 As she
explained, San Remo interpreted a federal statute.88 If there is any
inconsistency between that statute and the Civil Rights Act, it is one that
Congress created, and one that Congress could fix. Justice Kagan’s point
was primarily one about stare decisis; that is, because Congress “can
reverse the San Remo preclusion rule any time it wants,” the Court ought
to adhere to its prior precedents.89 Justice Kagan is certainly right that
Congress could have overturned San Remo, and she was also right to
82. San Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 335–39, 342 (2005).
83. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019); see Somin & Saxer, supra
note 64, at 10.
84. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994).
85. See Sterk, supra note 8, at 276–77 (acknowledging that “claim preclusion, combined
with the Williamson County ripeness requirements, provides a nearly insurmountable obstacle for
claimants seeking federal court litigation of federal takings claims”).
86. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167, 2174, 2179.
87. Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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continue sounding the alarm bells about the majority’s treatment of
precedent throughout the Term.90
But the point that the preclusion “trap” is set by a federal statute (and
by San Remo) goes to the substance of the Court’s position as well, in
two ways. First, if the Court had a problem with the preclusive effect of
state court takings judgments and was unwilling to wait for Congress to
fix it, then the Court should have trained its focus on the case which
confirmed that preclusive effect: San Remo. Williamson County merely
held that takings claims are not fully ripe until the plaintiff has been
finally denied compensation through a state’s processes.91 Nothing about
that holding entraps anyone. And in light of the variety of institutional
forms for state takings processes discussed above, as well as the practical
considerations discussed below, Williamson County sensibly reflected
the reality of land use decision-making. It was San Remo that lowered the
boom on takings plaintiffs, and not unintentionally. Indeed, the Court in
San Remo knew exactly what it was doing. This was no mistake or
oversight: The Court explained in San Remo,
At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the
concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to statecourt proceedings that are not chosen, but are instead
required in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever
the merits of that concern may be, we are not free to
disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve
the availability of a federal forum.92
In other words, little if anything about the “preclusion trap” argument
speaks to why Williamson County was wrongly decided on its own
terms.93
90. See id. at 2189–90; Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the Court
will overrule next.”).
91. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–95
(1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162.
92. San Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005).
93. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167, 2174, 2179. A further oddity of the Court’s approach in
Knick is that, while purporting to overrule Williamson County and not San Remo, the Court never
explained why San Remo’s preclusion rule did not mandate dismissal of Ms. Knick’s federal
action. Ms. Knick, after all, had brought a taking claim in Pennsylvania state court before bringing
her federal action. Id. at 2168. She could have sought, but did not seek, monetary compensation
in that state court action. Id. Under the logic of San Remo, the Court should have invoked claim
preclusion doctrine to dismiss her action. See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. The
Court did not do so—without any suggestion that it was overruling or limiting San Remo. In any
event, one can only hope that the Court’s opinion in Knick does not give future takings plaintiffs
two bites at the apple—one in state court followed by a second in federal court. That result would
clearly be inconsistent with the Court’s full faith and credit jurisprudence discussed below.
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But for those upset about the “trap,” overruling Williamson County
was far more attractive than limiting San Remo. This was so because San
Remo’s interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Statute is far from an
outlier. That is, revisiting San Remo would have altered the terrain for a
whole host of civil rights plaintiffs. Overruling Williamson County to
open the “trap”—backwards though that path may have been—ensured
that it opens only for takings plaintiffs.
In case after case long preceding San Remo, the Court has used the
Full Faith and Credit Statute to bar plaintiffs from federal litigation of
federal constitutional claims, and has expressed no concern about the
same trap. Indeed, the Knick Court’s insistence that the Civil Rights Act
“guarantees” a federal forum for state violations of constitutional rights
simply does not accord with the Court’s prior encounters with these
statutes.94 What appears like unfair treatment for takings plaintiffs is thus
not nearly so unique.
In Allen v. McCurry,95 for example, the Court held that a state court’s
rejection of a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment case brought under the Civil
Rights Act precluded him from relitigating that issue in federal court.96
In that case, undercover police officers in St. Louis approached Willie
McCurry’s front door and asked to buy some heroin while other officers
hid nearby.97 McCurry responded by shooting at and wounding the
undercover officers. Police returned fire, and McCurry surrendered.98
The officers then entered his home without a warrant and found heroin in
plain view and in drawers.99 At McCurry’s drug possession trial, he
moved to suppress all of the heroin the officers found.100 A Missouri court
granted his motion with respect to the heroin found in drawers but denied
it with respect to the heroin found in plain view.101 After his conviction,
McCurry sued the officers in federal district court under the Civil Rights
Act, alleging that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment
rights.102 The district court held, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the
state court judgment issued in his criminal trial prevented him from

94. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. The original phrase the Court quotes is that the statute
“provide[s]” such a federal forum. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994). Similarly
misplaced, as the following discussion will illustrate, is the suggestion that access to federal courts
is always available to provide a “minimum floor of constitutional rights.” Somin & Saxer, supra
note 64, at 12.
95. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
96. Id. at 103–05.
97. Id. at 92.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 91.
101. Id. at 92.
102. Id.
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litigating the issue in federal court.103 Interpreting the Full Faith and
Credit Statute, the Court explained that, while the Civil Rights Act
“create[d] a new federal cause of action,” it changed “nothing about the
preclusive effect of state court judgments.”104 And in language that seems
to have anticipated and rebutted the Knick majority’s reasoning thirty
years in advance, the Court expressly rejected the notion “that every
person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered
opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of
the legal posture in which the federal claim arises.”105 Indeed, there is “no
reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a
federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already
decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding
in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.”106 That is, even
plaintiffs who did not voluntarily choose a state court forum in which to
advance their constitutional rights are bound in federal court by the
results of those state court proceedings. This is hardly a “guarantee” of a
federal forum for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment by states.
The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to alleged
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments by states. In Migra v.
Warren City School District,107 the Court considered whether a state court
judgment might be preclusive, not only as to issues actually litigated in
state court, but as to issues the plaintiff “could have raised but did not
raise” in those state proceedings.108 In this case, a public school
supervisor claimed in federal court to have been terminated by her school
board in violation of the First Amendment as retaliation for protected
speech. She also raised due process and equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment.109 But in earlier state court proceedings about
the same termination, she made only state law breach of contract and
tortious interference arguments.110 She prevailed there, and the Supreme
Court concluded that she was not entitled to another bite at the apple in
federal court on her constitutional claims. The Civil Rights Act, the Court
held, “does not override state preclusion law and guarantee petitioner a
right to proceed to judgment in state court on her state claims and then
turn to federal court for adjudication of her federal claims.”111

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 92–93, 105.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
465 U.S. 75 (1984).
Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 85.
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Finally, the Court held in Matsushita Electric v. Epstein112 that
settlement of a class action in state court that purported to release even
federal claims that could not have been brought in state court operated to
preclude class members from litigating those claims in federal court.113
There, a Delaware court approved the settlement of a state law class
action which expressly released alleged violations of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission rules promulgated under the Exchange
Act.114 Some class members pressed ahead with those securities claims
in federal court on the theory that the Exchange Act confers exclusive
jurisdiction on federal courts and that the Delaware judgment could
therefore not preclude them from litigating that claim in federal court.115
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the same Full Faith and Credit
Statute at issue in San Remo, Allen, and Migra is “generally applicable in
cases in which the state-court judgment at issue incorporates a classaction settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.”116 And just like it did in Allen and Migra with respect to
the Civil Rights Act, the Court concluded that nothing in the Exchange
Act expressly or impliedly altered the federal courts’ obligation under the
Full Faith and Credit Statute to give preclusive effect to state court
judgments—even those having to do with causes of action that could
never have been brought in state court to begin with.117
So criminal defendants who by necessity litigated their Fourth
Amendment claims in their state court criminal trials cannot relitigate
those claims in federal court. Civil rights plaintiffs who never litigated
their First and Fourteenth Amendment claims in state court cannot raise
them in federal court if they could have raised them in state court. And
plaintiffs who not only did not but could not have litigated their federal
law claims in state court cannot raise them in federal court if a state court
settlement purports to release those claims. If takings plaintiffs faced a
“preclusion trap,” then they were in very good company. In an earlier
opinion urging the Court to overrule Williamson County, Justice Clarence
Thomas claimed that this treatment of takings claims “has downgraded
the protection afforded by the Takings Clause to second-class status,”118
but if that were true, then the Takings Clause was in good company too.
112. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
113. Id. at 375.
114. Id. at 387.
115. Id. at 380; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
116. Matsushita Elec., 516 U.S. at 375.
117. Id. at 380–81. The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the preclusive
effect of a state court judgment over antitrust claims under the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985).
118. Arrigoni Enters. v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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This is not the place to explore whether all of these cases were rightly
or wrongly decided. But they are nonetheless the law in these other
arenas, and they call into serious question the Knick Court’s indignation
that the federal courts were uniquely closed to takings plaintiffs,
rendering the takings clause a second-class constitutional right. They also
expose the Court’s inconsistent efforts at making that forum more easily
accessible. Contrast the Court’s approach in these earlier cases—which
privileges federalism, comity, respect for state courts, and finality over
the interests of individual plaintiffs119—with its approach in Knick—
which does the opposite. The majority (and dissent, unfortunately) do not
even mention Allen, Migra, or Matsushita, let alone attempt to reconcile
the solicitude Knick offers to takings plaintiffs with the lack of such
solicitude for other civil rights plaintiffs. This inconsistency is all the
more ironic in light of the fact that there are especially good reasons to
channel takings claims into state court—primarily that takings claims
necessarily turn on a baseline of state property law, as we discuss in the
next Part—and very few good reasons to do the same for other civil rights
claims.120 Indeed, one might be forgiven for concluding that the Court
likes precluding some plaintiffs from relitigating their state court losses
in federal court—class action plaintiffs and First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment plaintiffs—just not takings plaintiffs.
III. PRACTICAL ISSUES
The Court’s decision in Knick will present federal courts with a
number of practical difficulties—some of which the Justices clearly
understood, and others that garnered no discussion in either the majority
opinion or the dissent. Justice Kagan’s dissent highlighted some, but not
all, of the federalism concerns raised by federal litigation whose outcome
largely turns on state property law.121 But neither the majority nor the
dissent focused on two other issues certain to provoke future litigation:
When is a taking “final” within the meaning of Williamson County’s first
ripeness requirement, and does the Knick ruling open the doors of the
federal courthouse to the myriad valuation claims that arise when state
and local governments institute condemnation proceedings?
A. Peculiarities of State Substantive Law
Resolution of takings claims will frequently rest on the substance of
state property law, which often varies from state to state. State court
119. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec., 516 U.S. at 385–86; Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist., 465
U.S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104–05 (1980).
120. Sterk, supra note 8, at 286–92, 300 (“[T]he unusual Williamson County ripeness
doctrine tracks the unusual nature of federal takings claims, which are heavily dependent on the
content of background state law.”).
121. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2187–89 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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judges, who confront these issues with greater frequency, are in a better
position to understand the background of their respective state’s property
law than are federal judges who rarely deal with property disputes.122
Moreover, especially at the appellate level, the federal judges deciding
takings cases may be from states other than the state in which the alleged
taking occurred.
Although Justice Kagan’s dissent recognized the federalism concerns
raised by the Court’s decision,123 her opinion did not fully articulate the
range of state law issues that are likely to arise in future takings litigation.
1. Regulatory Takings
Justice Kagan cited two examples in which underlying state law might
be critical to evaluating regulatory takings claims. The first is Knick
itself.124 Whether the township’s requirement that Ms. Knick keep the
graveyard on her property open to the public effects a taking depends, in
considerable measure, on Pennsylvania’s background law governing
cemeteries and burials. That law may differ materially from cemetery law
in other states.125
Justice Kagan’s second example involved divergent state approaches
to beachfront land.126 In a number of states, the public trust doctrine
provides a background limitation on development rights along the
beachfront, so that legislative regulation of the beachfront does not
significantly change background law.127 In other states that subscribe to
a narrower conception of the public trust doctrine, similar regulation
might raise a more persuasive taking claim.128
The Court’s recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin129 provides yet
another illustration of the importance of state property law in evaluating
regulatory takings claims. Murr concerned a Wisconsin regulation that
122. Id. at 2188.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2187.
125. Professor Alfred Brophy’s exploration of cemetery law reveals a number of differences
among the states. For instance, Indiana grants a right of access across cemetery land one day each
year, while other states grant much broader access not merely across cemetery land, but across
land necessary to arrive at cemetery land. Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights
of the Graveyard, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1469, 1482–88.
126. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2188 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Jack Potash, The Public Trust Doctrine and Beach Access: Comparing New
Jersey to Nearby States, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 661, 672–73 (2016) (noting that New Jersey’s
public trust doctrine requires public access to the dry sand area of privately owned land).
128. For instance, in Maryland and Delaware, private owners have the right to exclude
members of the public from the dry sand area of beaches. Id. at 673–77. In these states, a
regulation limiting a right to exclude might present a more plausible taking claim than the same
regulation in New Jersey.
129. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
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increased the minimum lot size for development along a waterway.130
The owner of what had previously been two separate lots challenged the
regulation because it made development on one of the lots unlawful,
leading the landowner to contend that the regulation had deprived that lot
of all economic value and was therefore a per se taking under the doctrine
articulated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.131 The
underlying question was whether the two parcels together constituted the
“denominator” against which the taking claim should be measured, or
whether each parcel individually was its own “denominator.”132 Both the
majority and the dissent concluded that state law was relevant to that
inquiry,133 but Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the case
should be remanded to the state court because the state law on the issue
should be dispositive.134
These examples are far from exhaustive. The point is that in a host of
regulatory taking cases, Knick will now require federal courts to make
decisions about the content of underlying state property law in the first
instance, often with limited guidance from state courts. If, as the Chief
Justice indicated in Murr, defining property rights is ultimately a state
law function, concerns about intervention by federal courts insufficiently
attuned to the nuances surrounding those rights should have militated
against the Court’s result in Knick.
2. Other Implicit Takings
Regulatory takings of the sort at issue in Knick comprise a subset—
albeit an important one—of a broader set of actions that landowners often
challenge as takings. An implicit taking claim can also arise when, acting
in an enterprise capacity, government causes harm that would, if
committed by a private owner, be compensable under state nuisance or
trespass law.135 For instance, a local government might operate a waste
130. Id. at 1939–40.
131. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941, 1943.
132. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–49.
133. Id. at 1945 (noting that courts should give substantial weight to treatment under state
law); id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that state law should determine the private
property at issue).
134. Id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
135. In an influential article, Professor Joseph Sax first identified “enterprise capacity”
taking claims as a distinct category. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 62 (1964). Sax argued that when government caused harm while acting in its enterprise
capacity, the adversely affected landowner was entitled to compensation. Id. at 64. Sax later
repudiated that mechanical rule. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 n.5 (1971). Sax’s insight that enterprise capacity claims are different from
claims of excessive regulation remains significant, and enterprise capacity claims are statistically
more likely to be successful than claims of excessive regulation. See James E. Krier & Stewart E.
Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 59 tbl.2 (2016).
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disposal facility that devalues neighboring land or an airport that causes
disruptive noise.136 Alternatively, government might act as a public
utility, and its provision of water might cause private wells to run dry,137
or its operation of a sewer system might cause harmful backups.138
Although in each of these cases, the harms suffered are similar to those
generally covered by tort law, governmental immunity doctrines
applicable in many states have precluded tort actions against the state or
other governmental entities.139 State constitutions, however, have taking
clauses that trump legislatively-created immunity doctrines.140 As a
result, landowners have often styled their claims as claims under the
takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions rather than as tort
claims.141 In light of Knick, these claims are apparently cognizable in
federal court too.
The importance of state law extends beyond immunity doctrine.
Underlying state substantive property law may affect whether
government’s harm-causing activity is actionable at all. For instance, in
some states, landowners may have no right to prevent others from drilling
wells that interfere with subsurface water levels, while other states
136. See, e.g., Wilson v. Key Tronic Corp., 701 P.2d 518, 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
137. See, e.g., Jones v. E. Lansing-Meridian Water & Sewer Auth., 296 N.W.2d 202, 203
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam).
138. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gilbert v. City of Cincinnati, 928 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ohio 2010)
(per curiam).
139. See Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV. 341, 362 (2018)
(noting that state statutes enacted in the early twentieth century granted government immunity
from tort suits, restricting the ability of landowners to bring nuisance suits against the
government). Professor Robert Brauneis has noted, however, that in the nineteenth century, state
courts had developed exceptions to immunity doctrine that held government entities and
government officials liable for trespass and other injuries to real property. Robert Brauneis, The
First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just
Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 75–82 (1999). Even when sovereign immunity waivers
permit suits against the state, though, the remedies available to the landowner may be limited by
damage caps. Brady, supra, at 397.
140. See Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 819, 853–54 (2006) (noting that state constitutional taking clauses were treated as waivers
of sovereign immunity).
141. In a number of modern cases, courts have dismissed tort claims but permitted taking
claims to prevail. In many of these cases, plaintiffs relied on the takings clause in the state
constitution. See, e.g., Brewer v. State, 341 P.3d 1107, 1118, 1120–21 (Alaska 2014) (holding the
state immune in tort for damages caused by fire set to deprive an advancing wildfire of fuel);
Peterman v. Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 521 N.W.2d 499, 511–12, 514 (Mich. 1994) (holding that
destruction of fast lands does not fall within trespass–nuisance exception to sovereign immunity
but does give rise to taking claim); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630–35 (Utah
1990) (holding that a sovereign immunity statute does not apply to taking claims). In other cases,
plaintiffs have also relied on the federal constitution’s takings clause. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants
at 25–27, Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730 (Utah 2010) (No. 20081061), 2009 WL
6811344, at *25–28.
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recognize such a right.142 Those differences may dictate different
approaches to taking claims when government entities drill wells that
cause a drop in the water table, resulting in difficulties for neighboring
landowners who rely on their own wells for water. By the same token,
the strength of a taking claim arising from the government’s operation of
a landfill may depend in part on the state’s common law of nuisance. If a
private actor would not be liable for analogous activities, there is less
basis for holding that the government has taken the neighbor’s property.
Knick also threatens to enmesh federal courts in construction of state
constitutional provisions, which play a significant role in taking claims
arising out of nonregulatory government actions. Many states provide
broader property protection than the federal constitution, requiring
compensation not just for taking of property, but also for “damaging” of
property.143 In states whose constitutions include these “damaging”
clauses, claimants typically allege that the government action constituted
both a (federal and state) taking and a (state) damaging.144 Until Knick,
these actions would be heard in state court, and any state constitutional
claims would ultimately be resolved by the state supreme court.145 Knick,
however, suggests that a plaintiff who alleges a taking may proceed to
federal court on the federal taking claim, putting the federal court in the
position of resolving the pendent state constitutional claims as well. The
Knick opinion appears to foreclose federal abstention, pending resolution
of these state constitutional claims.146 As a result, federal courts will have
to either certify these state constitutional questions to state courts
(increasing the delay and cost of litigation)147 or decide these important
questions of state constitutional law themselves.
B. The Williamson County “Final Decision” Requirement
The second practical issue raised by Knick arises from the fact that
Williamson County imposed two ripeness requirements, not one.
142. Compare Bingham, 235 P.3d at 739 (no taking), with Jones, 296 N.W.2d at 205 (taking).
143. See generally Brady, supra note 139, at 344, 355–60 (discussing how the Constitution
does not include the word “damage” but many states have takings clauses that include the words
“damage” or “damaging”).
144. See id. at 393–94, 398.
145. See id. at 378–82 (discussing different state courts struggling to interpret damages
clauses).
146. If the Court in Knick had contemplated federal abstention pending resolution of state
law claims, it would not be true that a property owner who has suffered a taking may, without
regard to subsequent state court proceedings, “sue the government at that time in federal court for
the ‘deprivation’ of a right ‘secured by the Constitution.’” Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct.
2162, 2170 (2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).
147. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions
of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1697 (2003) (noting that temporal and monetary costs of
certification are not insignificant).
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Williamson County’s now-abandoned requirement that federal taking
plaintiffs first use state compensation procedures had initially shielded
federal courts from litigation about the first requirement: a taking claim
does not become ripe until the relevant state or municipal body has made
the final decision that works a taking of property.148 The landowner in
Knick did not challenge the first requirement, which in the Court’s words
was “not at issue here.”149
But Knick’s abolition of the state compensation requirement will
generate more pressure on the final decision requirement. Federal courts
will now have to determine when a local decision becomes final.
Moreover, the Court has not made it clear whether that inquiry should be
governed by local law or by federal constitutional law. Take Williamson
County for example. In that case, the landowner faced the common
situation in which a proposed development required the approval of
multiple bodies.150 The county’s legislative body was responsible for first
amending a zoning ordinance to reduce the permissible density in the
district.151 The Zoning Board of Appeals then had authority to interpret
the ordinance and to grant variances from its terms.152 County ordinances
further required a third body—the County Planning Commission—to
approve all subdivisions of land.153 The landowner faced the following
dilemma: After the legislative body reduced the permissible density on
the subject parcel by amending the ordinance, the Planning Commission
denied the landowner’s subdivision, in part relying on the excess
density.154 The Zoning Board of Appeals concluded that the older
ordinance was applicable, obviating the need for any variance,155 but the
Planning Commission concluded that the Zoning Board of Appeals had
no authority to review its determination that the amended ordinance
governed (a state law issue).156 The landowner then brought a taking
claim in federal district court.157
In holding that the landowner’s claim was not ripe because the
landowner had not received a final decision on its development proposal,
the Supreme Court focused on the landowner’s failure to seek variances
148. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169.
149. Id.
150. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 175–76,
overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162. For general discussion of the various bodies involved in the
land use approval process, see PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 4:5 to :7 (5th
ed. 2008).
151. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 178.
152. Id. at 180 n.3.
153. Id. at 176.
154. Id. at 178–79.
155. Id. at 180–81.
156. Id. at 181–82.
157. Id. at 182.
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the Zoning Board of Appeals could have granted from the terms of the
zoning ordinance and variances the Planning Commission could have
granted from the county’s subdivision regulations.158 On the merits—
which the Court did not reach—the landowner’s taking claim faced
significant problems. The landowner had already obtained final approval
for 212 units on a portion of the development,159 and even its expert
conceded at trial that it could accommodate all of the Planning
Commission’s objections and still build an additional 67 units.160 But the
issue that federal courts now will face is not the issue on the merits, but
how to determine when the alleged taking became final—an issue that so
far has plagued even the state courts that are more likely to be familiar
with local zoning processes.
First, in the common case of multi-board review, must the landowner
seek relief from each involved board before courts will deem the claim
ripe? The Williamson County court noted the need to seek variances from
both the Planning Commission and the Zoning Board of Appeals—even
though the latter had interpreted the ordinance in a way that would have
made variances unnecessary.161 Moreover, suppose both the Zoning
Board of Appeals and the Planning Commission had denied variances.
The landowner still could have applied to the local legislative body—the
body that tightened the zoning requirements—for an amendment of the
ordinance. Because the difference between local legislative bodies and
local administrative bodies has no particular federal constitutional
significance, it is difficult to see why the finality requirement would not
also encompass the need to seek a zoning amendment.162
Second, does the nature of the variance matter? It would be easy for a
landowner to seek a variance that would clearly be denied if that would
be enough to ripen a taking claim. But denial of that variance would not
establish the local board’s resistance to a more modest variance request.
The local board is typically a reactive body; it does not generate
development plans on its own. The typical approval process involves a
give-and-take between developer and board in which the developer

158. Id. at 188.
159. Id. at 178.
160. Id. at 182.
161. Id. at 181. The Zoning Board of Appeals had determined that the Commission should
apply the prior ordinance and subdivision regulations, and it also determined that the Planning
Commission should resolve other disputed issues in a manner favorable to the developer. Id. Had
the Planning Commission accepted the Zoning Board’s determination, the need for further
variances would have been obviated.
162. See, e.g., Southdown, Inc. v. Jackson Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 809 A.2d 1059, 1068
(Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2002) (holding that “[w]hen a use [of property] is proscribed . . . the party seeking
the non-conforming use must request, inter alia, a variance or zoning change”).
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proposes and the board reacts.163 If the goal of ripeness is to sharpen a
court’s understanding of what a board would ultimately approve, the
ripeness requirement might require a developer to make multiple
applications to ripen its claim.
Third, should courts engraft a futility exception onto the requirement
that a landowner obtain variances? Landowners sometimes assert that
applications would be fruitless because the local board has made it clear
that any applications would be denied.164 If courts were to develop a
futility exception to the ripeness requirement, the next hurdle would be
determining what evidence suffices to trigger the exception.
Knick also raises difficult finality questions with respect to taking
claims that do not involve regulation. Consider, for instance, a landowner
who has suffered flooding as the result of a road construction project.
Suppose, under state law, the flooding would constitute a nuisance.
Suppose further that the landowner would have a claim for injunctive
relief, money damages, or both. Does she have a ripe taking claim? If, as
the court suggests in Knick, the taking is separate from the remedy, the
landowner could argue that the taking claim is ripe as soon as the flooding
starts—even if state law doctrine makes it clear that the landowner has
other remedies outside of taking law for the harm she has suffered.
These are only a few of the ripeness issues federal courts will now
face in light of Knick.165 One might take the Court’s statement that the
finality requirement is not at issue as a signal that the Court will revisit
that requirement as well. But it is difficult to imagine how takings
litigation can proceed without crystallization of the government’s
position, a function that Williamson County’s first ripeness requirement
currently serves. Knick means federal courts will inevitably be drawn into
these thickets now.
C. The Impact of Knick on Condemnation Proceedings
Although implicit taking cases attract the lion’s share of attention in
academia and at the Supreme Court, explicit taking cases are the bread
and butter of many property lawyers. Sometimes, as in Kelo v. City of
163. See Stewart E. Sterk & Kimberly J. Brunelle, Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res
Judicata Doctrine in Land Use Cases, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1165 (2011) (noting the give-andtake process that educates landowners about objections and enables landowners to present a new
application that better accommodates neighborhood concerns).
164. See, e.g., Hendee v. Putnam Twp., 786 N.W.2d 521, 532 (Mich. 2010) (rejecting an
argument that futility exception ripened landowner’s taking claim against allegedly exclusionary
zoning ordinance).
165. Suppose, for instance, a landowner who wants to demolish a historic building seeks to
challenge a historic district designation as a taking. Must the landowner first obtain a final denial
of an application for a demolition permit? See Casey v. Mayor of Rockville, 929 A.2d 74, 107–
09 (Md. 2007) (answering in the affirmative).
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New London,166 the issue is whether the government’s taking is for public
use.167 In the more common case, the dispute is over the valuation of the
property taken.
These explicit taking cases have largely been fodder for state courts.
In light of Williamson County and San Remo, a landowner unhappy with
a state’s resolution of an explicit taking claim was effectively limited to
state court. Knick, however, appears to open federal court doors to some
or all of these explicit taking claims, potentially raising a host of issues
the Court did not anticipate.
The Court in Knick expressly separated the “taking” inquiry from the
“just compensation” inquiry, and on top of the problems we have already
discussed, it is no easy matter to determine when an explicit taking
occurs. Perhaps the taking occurs when title vests in the condemnor.
Alternatively, the taking might occur when the condemnor becomes
entitled to possession. State law varies materially. For instance, in
Massachusetts, a government condemnor acquires title and the right to
possession without the need for any judicial proceeding.168 Once the
condemnor adopts and records an order of taking, title transfers to the
condemnor and the condemnee obtains a right to damages for the
taking.169 By contrast, in Ohio, the condemnor does not acquire title or
the right to possession until after judicial condemnation proceedings are
complete.170 And in Nebraska, title does not vest in the condemnor until
the condemnor actually puts the property to use.171 Knick’s conceptual
separation of the “taking” from the “just compensation” might suggest
that in Massachusetts, an aggrieved landowner could seek just
compensation in federal court as soon as the condemning agency orders
the taking, while in Ohio and Nebraska, no federal claim would ever
become available, because the claim would not become ripe until the state
court had determined just compensation—a determination that would
then preclude relitigation of the compensation issue in federal court under
San Remo. Like the ones we explored in Section II.B, this disparity in
result—again based solely on differences in state procedure—appears
difficult to justify as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Moreover, even in states that generally hold that title does not vest
until the close of condemnation proceedings, statutes sometimes provide
for quick take proceedings which give the condemnor a right to

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Id. at 472.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 3 (2019).
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.15 (LexisNexis 2019).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-714 (2019).
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possession upon payment into court of an estimated value.172 In Ohio, the
payment by the condemnor into court, and the condemnee’s withdrawal
of the funds “shall in no way interfere with the action [for just
compensation] except that the sum so withdrawn shall be deducted from
the sum of the final verdict or award.”173 Would use of the quick take
procedure ripen a federal claim, in the midst of the state condemnation
proceeding? Nothing in the Knick opinion answers the question.
Robert Thomas has suggested that Knick might not apply to explicit
exercises of the eminent domain power because, in those sorts of cases,
the government admits it owes compensation.174 But, of course, valuation
disputes arise because the government does not admit that it owes the
compensation the landowner believes the Constitution requires. The
difference between the parties’ respective assessments of what the
Constitution requires can be vast.175 Moreover, in some eminent domain
cases, the issue is whether a particular interest constitutes constitutionally
compensable property—the very same issue that arises in implicit taking
cases.176
If a federal taking claim does become ripe before a state determines
just compensation, the federal court hearing the claim faces another set
of questions: May it (or must it) bypass state procedures for determining
compensation? In many states, the initial compensation decision is made
by commissioners, often with expertise in valuation matters.177 In others,
the compensation determination is made by courts without the benefit of
a jury.178 Some states provide that the condemnee is entitled to attorney’s
fees. In some states, courts have discretion to award fees where the order
is in excess of the condemnor’s offer.179 In other states, fees are awarded
only if, at trial, the judgment exceeds the condemnor’s initial offer by a
specified amount.180 For example, in Florida, the fees are based on how

172. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.06. See generally 7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § G2.04 (2019) (summarizing differences between normal and quick takings).
173. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.06(c).
174. Thomas, supra note 70, at 24.
175. For instance, in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013), the
government offered $300 in compensation to a landowner for losses resulting from a dune
construction project, while the landowner claimed entitlement to $500,000 for loss of an ocean
view. The government argued—and the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed—that because the
project increased the value of landowner’s parcel as a whole, the landowner was not entitled to
separate compensation for loss of the view.
176. See, e.g., id.
177. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-504 (2018).
178. See, e.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 501(B) (McKinney 2019).
179. See, e.g., id. § 701.
180. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 32.28(3) (2018) (awarding litigation expenses when award
exceeds condemnor’s highest offer by at least 15%).
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much benefit the lawyer achieved for the condemnee.181 If these claims
are brought in federal court, are federal courts required to apply some or
all of these state rules?182 Resolution of the issue might depend on the
purpose of the state law rules and, in any event, would require further
litigation.
Federal courts would also have to face substantive explicit taking
issues from which they have so far been spared. Two examples are
illustrative. First, suppose a governmental entity condemns land already
subject to regulation. Certainly the landowner’s compensation should not
be measured by the value of the land if it were unregulated. But in
computing just compensation, should a court consider the likelihood that,
absent condemnation, the landowner might be able to obtain modification
of the regulations? Some state courts have concluded that compensation
should consider the possibility of modification,183 but the likelihood of
modification will depend heavily on background state law. Federal courts
are at a comparative disadvantage in assessing that likelihood.
Second, when a government entity condemns only part of a
landowner’s land, the condemnation might affect the value of the
remainder of the landowner’s land—either positively or negatively.184
181. The Florida statute defines benefits as the difference “between the final judgment or
settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires
an attorney.” FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a) (2019). The statutory fees are 33% of any benefit up to
$250,000, plus 25% of any portion of the benefit between $250,000 and $1,000,000, plus 20% of
any portion of the benefit exceeding $1,000,000. Id. § 73.092(1)(c).
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.”).
183. See, e.g., Spriggs v. State, 54 A.D.2d 1080, 1081 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that
valuation should consider likelihood that condemnee’s property would be rezoned to permit more
intensive use). New York courts have also indicated that valuation should take into account the
possibility that the existing zoning would be invalidated as a taking. See In re New Creek Bluebelt,
Phase 3, 156 A.D.3d 163, 166–67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (holding that when condemnor takes
property already regulated as wetlands, condemnee is entitled to incremental increase to reflect
the reasonable probability that the wetlands regulations themselves would have been found to
constitute a regulatory taking).
184. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013), illustrates both the
positive and negative effects of condemnation. The borough condemned beachfront land to
construct a dune that would connect to other dunes and protect homes and businesses of the area
against ocean storms. Id. at 526. The condemnation had two effects on the remainder of
condemnees’ land: it protected the remainder of their property from storms, and it interfered with
the view of the ocean from their home. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
condemnation award should be determined by subtracting fair market value after the taking from
fair market value before the taking. Id. at 527. The court acknowledged that other states had held
that only “special” benefits, not “general” benefits could be considered to reduce the amount of
compensation available in cases of partial taking, but it indicated that determining what constitutes
a “special” benefit varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Id. at 539, 540.
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States differ on how just compensation should account for those changes
in the value of landowner’s remaining land,185 presenting another set of
substantive issues federal courts will be called upon to resolve if they now
have jurisdiction over just compensation for explicit takings.
Finally, aside from valuation issues, Knick may open the federal
courts to “public use” challenges of the sort the Supreme Court faced in
Kelo v. City of New London. Although Kelo leaves little room for federal
constitutional challenges based on the absence of public use,186 the
Court’s opinion,187 and particularly Justice Kennedy’s concurrence,188
keeps the door open—at least a crack—for public use challenges.
Permitting such challenges to proceed in federal court in the first instance
would be problematic, especially since many states impose public use
limitations that restrict governments more than those articulated by the
Supreme Court do.189
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Knick removes the barrier to federal court that
the Court had previously erected in its Williamson County and San Remo
185. See Brittany Harrison, Note, The Compensation Conundrum in Partial Takings Cases
and the Consequences of Borough of Harvey Cedars, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE-NOVO 31, 42–
51, http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/HARRISON.36.denovo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HPZ-A2HT] (surveying different state approaches).
186. The Court indicated that public purpose was to be defined broadly, “reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.” Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
187. The Court’s opinion concedes that “the sovereign may not take the property of A for the
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”
Id. at 477.
188. Justice Kennedy wrote:
My agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not
warranted for economic development takings in general, or for the particular
takings at issue in this case, does not foreclose the possibility that a more
stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff might
be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings. There may be
private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of
private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of
invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.
Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189. See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J.F. 82, 84, 85
(2015) (noting that forty-four states had changed their laws in response to Kelo, and that thirty of
them had tightened definitions of public use or public purpose); see also Ilya Somin, The Limits
of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2103–05 (2009)
(noting widespread response to Kelo, but concluding that much of it has been ineffective); cf. In
re Condemnation by the Re-development Auth. of Lawrence Cty., 962 A.2d 1257, 1263 (Pa.
Cmmw. Ct. 2008) (concluding that state law imposed stricter public use requirements than Kelo
did).
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decisions. Knick, however, rests on deeply questionable assumptions
about the structure and operation of state and local government and on
the incorrect premise that all constitutional claimants—other than taking
claimants—have been guaranteed a federal forum. Moreover, the
decision’s focus on regulatory takings ignores Knick’s potential
implications for other takings—both implicit and explicit. Federal courts
may now be drawn into resolving a host of difficult state law issues
outside their areas of expertise. Not even Justice Kagan’s dissent focused
on the decision’s potential scope, which will inevitably become fodder
for further litigation until the Court fashions a strategy to retreat from its
ill-founded and its ill-advised pronouncements.
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